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FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH CONSUMPTION
EXCISES
CHALES R. KAVANAUGH*
It is not surprising, in view of the complexity of the federal income tax laws and
the extent of their application, that the excise taxes are completely overshadowed by
the income taxes in the minds of many tax students and practitioners. Nevertheless,
the tendency on the part of some of them to dismiss excise taxes as temporary ex-
pedients is clearly unwarranted. Such taxes, in varying forms, are undoubtedly here
to stay and therefore deserve closer attention than is ordinarily accorded them. This
is particularly true at the present time, as it may well be that these taxes will be
extended to cover an ever widening circle.
Both historically and fiscally, excise taxes have played an important part in the
federal tax system. The experience of the Government with these taxes began 150
years ago and falls within three distinct periods-7i91 to i8o2,1 1813 to 1818,32 and
1862 to the present time.? The taxes on liquor and tobacco constituted the backbone
of our modern system of taxation at its inception in I862, and for many years there-
after these taxes continued to be the principal sources of internal revenue.' The in-
ternal revenue receipts for the first two periods referred to above were $6,758,764.6
and $25,833,449.43, respectively. 6 In contrast to these relatively modest amounts, total
tax collections for the fiscal year 1940 were in round figures 5 billion dollars.7 The
excise taxes produced approximately three-fifths of this sum, while the income taxes
accounted for the balance.8
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The taxes of the first period were imposed with respect to carriages, retail dealers in wines and
foreign spirituous liquors, snuff, refined sugar, property sold at auction, legal instruments, real estate, and
sales. Cowric:A'oN oF INTERNAL RVFNUE LAws (1938) xi.
a The subjects of the taxes of the second period were refined sugar, carriages, distillers, sales at auction,
distilled spirits, manufactured articles, household furniture, watches, gold, silver, plated ware, jewelry,
real estate, and slaves. Ibid.
'The Act of July x, 1862, which marked the beginning of the third period, created the office of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue and "taxed practically everything which Congress thought was sus-
ceptible of yielding revenue." Ibid. 'Ibid.
'Even in the fiscal year 1940, liquor and tobacco taxes produced more than one-fifth of the total
revenue. RaP. Co UR INT. REv. (1940) 1, 2.
SCODIFICATION oF INaTERNL RavENLE LAws (1938) xi.
'REP. CoM'st INT. R V. (1940) i, 2. 8 Ibid.
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
The purpose of this paper is to discuss important phases of the Government's
experience with such of the present excise taxes as may be classified as consumption
excises. Admittedly, the classification of excise taxes into consumption excises and
others is open to the objection that it is somewhat unrealistic, as government officials
do not, in the practical work of administering the excise tax laws, think or talk in
such terms. Nevertheless, it would seem that taxes which are measured by prices or
quantities and paid by consumers or passed on to them may properly be classified as
consumption excises.
ADmiSSIONS
The several admission taxes,0 collected' 0 from the patrons and paid over11 to the
collector, are component parts of a comprehensive system designed to cover admis-
sions as a whole.' 2
Admissions to Any Place
The admission tax which has the widest application is of course the one"8 with
respect to admissions to any place. Strangely enough, the nature of the transactions
to which this tax applies would seem to vary with the circumstances. In the usual
case where the amount paid exceeds the taxable minimum, the transaction is the
act of paying for the admission' 4 rather than the exercising of the privilege to enter,
for the tax is payable regardless of whether such privilege is ever exercised.' In the
case of a taxable free or reduced-rate admission,' 6 the nature of the transaction to
which the tax applies is not spelled out clearly in either the statute or the regulations.
If the right to such admission is evidenced by a ticket, the tax is payable upon the
issuance of the ticket.' 7 This requirement indicates that the taxable transaction is
the act of receiving the ticket or, in the case of a reduced-rate admission, probably
the payment for the ticket. On the other hand, if the right to such admission is not
evidenced by a ticket, the tax is payable upon admittance.' 8 The implication of this
requirement is that, in the case of a free admission, the transaction is the actual exer-
cise of the privilege to enter the place and that, in the case of a reduced-rate
admission, the transaction is either the same as in the other case or is the payment
for the admission, the payment of the tax being postponed until actual admittance
if the admission payment preceded that event.
The meaning of the term "place," as used in the statute'0 imposing the general
admission tax, has been the subject of some controversy. The regulations"0 provide
that the basic idea conveyed by this term is that of a definite inclosure or location,
and that places of amusement obviously constitute the most important class of
'INT. REv. CODE §1700.
"o d. §1715(a). '1 Id. §1715(b).12 Excluded from the present study, because not within the field of consumption excises as defincd,
are the taxes on sales of tickets at excessive prices.
1 INT. REv. CODE §1700(a)(I). I 4 U. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (1940) §I0Xo4.
16 Ibid. "8 See INT. REv. CODE §17oo(a)(1).1 7 U. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (1940) §101.5. 1 Ibid.
11 Cited supra note 13. 2 U. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (940) §101.3.
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"places." It includes, in addition to ordinary places of amusement, a swimming
pool, 21 a skating rink 2 2 and a private mountain resort,23 but it does not include a
sight-seeing aircraft.24 Another ground for contesting the application of this tax
has been that the charge in question was not for admission but rather for rent,
expenses, or other purposes. A charge required for admittance to a swimming pool 25
or skating rink 20 is an admission charge, even though payment entitles the persons
to the use of a swimming suit and towels or skates. The same rule applies where
a so-called toll charge27 is collected on a private road leading to a mountain resort,
and in the case of a so-called contribution2" paid for a ticket entitling the "con-
tributor" to a seat at a political mass meeting. But a charge for transporting guests
to and from an island on which is maintained a private beach is apparently for
transportation expenses and is not an admission charge.20 Nor is the amount which
a student is required to pay, as a student activity fee, for a non-transferable book good
for admission to student activities and athletic events 30 However, if the payment
by the student is voluntary, as in the case of student season tickets, it is held to be an
amount paid for admission.3'
This tax, as applicable to admissions to dances, may not be avoided by the ex-
pedient of a multiple or combination ticket. In such a case, the admission charge is
the total amount paid for the entire ticket.3 2  Several questions have also arisen
concerning application of the provisions as to taxable free or reduced-rate admis-
sions.3 3 The statutory exception as to persons who may be admitted free without
payment of tax does not include children over i= because of the fact they are inmates
of charitable institutions, nor members of the Civilian Conservation Corps, nor men
in the Army, Navy, or Marine Corps.3 4 It has also been urged that where ladies are
admitted to a ball game without charge or at reduced rates, no tax should be re-
quired, the theory being that the basis on which they are admitted constitutes the
established price for the accommodations to which they are restricted. But as their
seat accommodations are substantially similar to those in other parts of the stands
for which regular admission price is charged and as the privilege is confined to
women and limited to one day a week, the Bureau's position is that their admission
is taxable under the statute.35
The taxability of public admissions to athletic events held by state schools was
not definitely settled until recently. The application of the tax to such admissions
was vigorously contested on the ground that the tax unconstitutionally burdened the
"1 Twin Falls Natatorium v. U. S., 22 F. (2d) 308 (D. Idaho 1927); S. T. 859, 1937-i C. B. 334.
"U. S. v. Koller et al., 287 Fed. 418 (W. D. Wash. 1921), appeal dismissed, 260 U. S. 757 (1922).
23 Chimney Rock Co. v. U. S., 63 Ct. Cl. 66o (1927), cert. denied, 275 U. S. 552 (1927).
n S. T. 664, XII-I C. B. 424 (1932).
5 2Twin Falls Natatorium v. U. S., supra note 21. 2' U. S. v. Koller et al., supra note 22.
27Chimney Rock Co. v. U. S., supra note 23. " S. M. 2853, IV-I C. B. 294 (1924).
.s Huguenot Yacht Club v. U. S., 32 F. Supp. 387 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
'°S. T. 563, XI-2 C. B. 522 (1931). I1 1bid.
32S. T. 670, XII-I C. B. 423 (1932). sINT. REv. CODE §I700(a) (i).
"S. T. 9IO, 1940-2 C. B. 315. Cf. U. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (2940) §X01.5, excepting reporters,
photographers, telegraphers, and radio announcers whose special duties are the sole reason for their
presence. " S. T. 697, XII-2 C. B. 353 (932).
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states in the exercise of their governmental functions. The Supreme Court set this
problem at rest by holding3 6 that such admissions are properly taxable, saying that
"the conduct of exhibitions for admissions paid by the public is not such a function
of state government as to be free from the burden of a non-discriminatory tax laid
on all admissions to public exhibitions for which an admission fee is charged." Sim-
ilarly, admission charges to a swimming pool operated by a city or other municipality
are taxable3 7
Use or Lease of Boxes or Seats
The nature of the transaction embraced by the tax33 relating to boxes and seats
in an opera house or place of amusement is not clear, and apparently there are no
rulings or decisions on this point. As the tax applies regardless of whether the box
or seat is used or whether any amount was paid therefor,89 it would seem that the
tax is imposed with respect to a person's having the permanent use of or a lease for
the use of the accommodation. 40 The major difficulty encountered in administering
the law imposing this tax lies in computing the amount of the tax in certain in-
stances. The tax is based not on the amount, if any, actually paid for the box or seat,
but on the amount that would be paid, at the established price, for admission to all
performances given, not merely those attended, if payments were separately made for
each performance. 41 If there is no comparable box for the use of which on single
occasions admission charges are made, the tax is computed by determining the
amount for which a single box seat in the same part of the house is sold, multiplying
that amount by the number of seats in the box, and calculating the tax on the basis
above indicated. 42 If there is no box located in a similar position, the tax is computed
by determining the amount for which a single seat in the same part of the house is
sold, multiplying that amount by the number of seats in the box, and calculating the
tax accordingly 43
Admissions to Cabarets
The specific transaction to which the cabaret tax44 applies is not clear. Although,
in a broad sense, the transaction contemplated by the statute is the exercise of the
privilege to avail oneself of the entertainment, refreshment, and food furnished at the
cabaret, it would appear that technically the taxable transaction is the act of paying
the amount that includes the admission charge; for both the statute45 and the
regulations 46 provide that the tax applies to the payment of such amount.
Difficulties have been experienced in applying this tax to hotels providing orchestra
music and dancing facilities for their patrons in connection with their dining rooms.
The regulations47 state that the entertainment furnished in such a case is a public
"Allen v. Regents of the University System of Georgia, 304 U. S. 439 (1938).
"7S. T. 907, 1940-2 C. B. 316. "8 INT. REv. CODE §17oo(b)(I).
ssU. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (1940) §101-8. " CI. INT. REV. CODE §§1410, 1520, and x6oo.
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (1940) §io.8. 42lbid.
43 Ibid. "INT. REv. CODE §700(e) (1).
ArIbid. '0 U. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (1940) §510.13.
T Id. §101.14.
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performance for profit and that, if no admission charge for the dance is separately
made, the amount paid for refreshments shall be deemed to include the admission
charge. In a recent case, 48 the orchestra and dance floor were in one dining room,
but patrons of other dining rooms of the hotel were permitted to use the dance floor.
There was no cover, minimum, or other special charge. The court held that, though
the performance was public, it was not for profit, that no part of the amount paid for
refreshments was an admission charge, and that accordingly the hotel was not subject
to the tax. The court distinguished the entertainment in this case from entertainment
for profit by saying that here it was actually an item of general hotel overhead.
A minimum charge,49 entitling the patron without further payment to the food
and refreshments totaling that amount, is not an amount paid for admission within
the meaning of the statute imposing the general admission tax.50 If the minimum
charge is exceeded, it is included as part of the total bill on which the cabaret tax
is basedY' On the other hand, a so-called cover charge is taxable as an amount paid
for admission under the general admission statute.52 If such a charge is inadequate
to cover the cost of the entertainment provided, part of the charge for refreshment
is deemed to be for admission and subject to the cabaret tax.53 The determination of
the adequacy of the cover charges involves an examination of the daily food and
refreshment checks and a comparison of the receipts from cover charges with the
cost of the entertainment. This determination is frequently hard to make, par-
ticularly where the records of the cabaret proprietor are incomplete. In order to avoid
the application of two separate admission taxes in the case of cabarets making cover
charges and to eliminate the complications that are often involved in determining
the cabaret tax, it would seem that the admission tax laws should be so amended that
the general tax would not apply to cover charges and that the cabaret tax would be a
fixed percentage applicable to the total cabaret bill.
Exemptions
Admissions for the benefit of certain organizations and persons are exempt from
the admission taxes, if the varying conditions specified in the statute 4 are fulfilled.
Even though the purposes of an organization, as set forth in its by-laws, are charitable,
it will be denied exemption if any of the funds raised through admissions are used
for noncharitable activities. 5 Similarly, an organization which engages in educa-
tional and non-educational activities is not entitled to exemption as an educational
organization. 6 The exemptions as to persons have occasioned some difficulty.
Originally it was held that the exemption relating to firemen applied only if the
proceeds of the admissions inured to the benefit of the firemen of a city as a class.57
The present position of the Bureau, however, is that the exemption applies whether
the proceeds inure to the benefit of the class or of a single individual. 58 A condition
&$The Deshler Hotel Co. v. Busey, 36 F. Supp. 392 (S. D. Ohio 1941).
"S. T. 799, XIV-I C. B. 420 (1934).
"See INT. REV. CODE §1700(a) (i). "S. T. 799, supra note 49.
"U. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (1940) §xoi.13. "ibid.
"INT. REV. CODE §1701. 32 Op. ATT'Y GEN. (1921) 569.
"S. T. 885, 1939-2 C. B. 371. ' S. M. 2856, IV-i C. B. 295 (1924).
"S. M. 2856A, IV-" C. B. 251 (1924), revoking S. M. 2856, supra note 57.
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to the application of the exemption as to agricultural fairs is that no part of the net
earnings of the fair shall inure to the benefit of any stockholder of the fair associ-
ation." Net earnings are those arising from the operation of the fair itself.00 If the
association has stock outstanding upon which dividends may be paid when receipts
from the fair warrant such distribution, exemption will be denied."' It is immaterial
that the fair revenues for a particular year or series of years are devoted exclusively
to the improvement of fair property."2 But if the only earnings distributable are
those from sources other than the operation of the fair, the association will not be
barred from the exemption. 3 There is no exemption broad enough to cover the-
atrical performances sponsored by the Works Progress Administration,0 4 nor a club
organized to continue the associations formed at a citizens' military training camp
and to promote the success of the camp in succeeding years. 5 Curiously enough,
part of the amount paid for a given lot of admission tickets may be taxable and part
nontaxable. Thus where a charitable organization bought tickets from a theater and
sold them at a price in excess of the established price plus tax, the amounts paid to
the theater were ruled taxable, whereas the excessive charges made by the charitable
organization were not.06
Evasion and Avoidance
Field audits or investigations have uncovered various methods to evade or avoid
the admission taxes, though there seem to be no serious attempts at evasion in the
case of the tax relating to boxes or seats in opera houses or places of amusement. A
common method of evasion is failure to keep any records or the keeping of false
records. Again, the collecting agent may fail to collect or pay over the tax, or, in
the case of the general admission tax, he may try to muddy the waters by filing a
fraudulent or erroneous claim for exemption. In a few instances resort has been had
to collusive contracts in order to obtain the benefits of exemption. A dishonest officer
of an exempt organization may enter into such a contract with a promoter, the con-
tract providing that the proceeds of admissions will inure to the organization, but
the secret understanding being that part at least of the proceeds will go to the
promoter. As there is a minimum taxable admission in connection with the general
admission tax, such tax may be avoided altogether by reducing the admission price
below that figure. Similarly, a method of evading the cabaret tax involves the
proration of the total bill for a party of a number of persons among such persons,
in order that the prorated charges will be below the taxable amount.
DUES AND FEES
The taxes0 7 relating to dues and fees paid to a social, athletic, or sporting club or
arganization and life memberships in such a club or organization are paid"' by the
members to the club and paid over 9 by the club to the collector.
SINr. REv. CODE §1701(b). " S. T. 417, I-1 C. B. 268 (1922).
61 Ibid. e Ibid.
e'Ibid. 64S. T. 831, XV-x C. B. 403 (1935).
2 S. T. 455, IV-i C. B. 295 (1924). S. T. 631, XII-x C. B. 424 (1932).
67 INT. REv. CoDE §171o(a). "8 Id. §1710(b). "'Id. §1715(b).
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Dues
In view of a recent ruling70 that the higher rates which went into effect on July
I, 1940, apply to dues payments made on or after that date, regardless of when the
period covered by the dues began or ended, the transaction to which the dues tax7 -
applies would seem to be the payment of the dues. Broadly speaking, however, this
tax is imposed in respect of a person's possession of the right to enjoy the privileges
and facilities of the club or organization.
The determination of whether a particular club is a social one within the meaning
of the statute presents one of the major problems in the administration of the dues
tax statute. The tests72 which have been worked out administratively are simple;
it is the application of them that is difficult. If the social features are a material pur-
pose of the club, it is a social club. On the other hand, if the social features are not a
material purpose of the club, but are subordinate and merely incidental to the active
furtherance of a different and predominant purpose, such as religion, the arts, educa-
tion or business, it is not a social club. While the courts have not found fault with
these administrative tests, they have experienced similar difficulty in applying them.
Recent cases involving the application of these tests are listed in the margin.73
A club for the practice or promotion of athletics or sports is an athletic or sporting
o S. T. 904, 1940-2 C. B. 320.
"INT. REv. CODE § 710(a) (i). eaU. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (1940) §101.38.
a Clubs held socida: Duquesne Club v. U. S., 23 F. Supp. 781 (Ct. Cl. x938), cert. denied, 3o6 U. S.
649 (1939); Denniston v. U. S., 23 F. Supp. 305 (S. D. Ala. 1938); Union Club of Hoboken v. U. S., 22
F. Supp. 416 (Ct. Cl. 1938); Detroit Club v. U. S., 22 F. Supp. 424 (Ct. Cl. 1938); St. Nicholas Club of
City of New York v. U. S., 22 F. Supp. 434 (Ct. Cl. 1938); Union Club Co. v. U. S., 21 F. Supp.
412 (Ct. Cl. 1937); Transportation Club of San Francisco v. U. S., 17 F. Supp. 201 (Ct. Cl. 1936);
Century Ass'n v. Anderson, xo F. Supp. 1oo5 (S. D. N. Y. 1935); Chicago Engineers' Club v. U. S., 9
F. Supp. 68o (Ctl. 1935); Chance v. U. S., 9 F. Supp. ioii (Ct. Cl. 1935); University Club, City of
Washington, D. C. v. U. S., 6 F. Supp. 129 (Ct. Cl. 1934); The Lambs v. U. S., 8 F. Supp. 737 (Ct.
Cl. 1934); Sagninaw Club v. U. S., 7 F. Supp. 302 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Town Club of St. Louis v. U. S.,
68 F. (2d) 620 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934); Union League Club of Chicago v. U. S., 4 F. Supp. 929 (Ct. Cl.
1933); Wichita Commercial & Social Club Ass'n V. U. S., 2 F. Supp. 476 (Ct. Cl. 1933); Quadrangle
Club v. U. S., 64 F. (2d) 8o (C. C. A. 7th, 1933); Quinnipiack Club v. U. S., 4 F. Supp. 996 (Ct. Cl.
1933); Phi Gamma Delta Club v. U. S., 5 F. Supp. 140 (Ct. Cl. 1933); Army and Navy Club of
America v. U. S., 53 F. (2d) 277 (Ct. Cl. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U. S. 548 (1932); Women's University
Club of Seattle v. Poe, 52 F. (2d) 447 (W. D. Wash. 1931); Fleming v. Reinecke, 52 F. (2d) 449 (C. C.
A. 7th, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 689 (1932); Women's University Club v. U. S., 5o F. (2d) 469 (Ct.
Cl. 1931); Abbott v. U. S., 66 Ct. Cl. 603 (1929), cert. denied, 28o U. S. 554 (1920); Fisler v. U. S.,
66 Ct. Cl. 220 (1928), cert. denied, 279 U. S. 836 (1929); Faculty Club of University of California v.
U. S., 65 Ct. Cl. 754 (1928). Clubs held not socida: Union Club of Pittsburgh v. Heiner, 99 F. (2d) 259
(C. C. A. 3 d, 1938) (businessmen's lunches); Krug v. Rasquin, 21 F. Supp. 866 (E. D. N. Y. 1937)(business); Century Club v. U. S., 12 F. Supp. 617 (Ct. Cl. 1935) (business and civic); Squantum Ass'n
v. Page, 7 F. Supp. 815 (D. R. I. 1934), afl'd, 77 F. (2d) 918 (C. C. A. ist, 1935) (serving food);
Whitehall Lunch Club v. U. S., 9 F. Supp. 132 (Ct. Cl. 1934); Tidwell v. Anderson, 72 F. (2d) 684
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) (faculty club); Houston, Club v. U. S., 58 F. (2d) 487 (Ct. Cl. 1932) (business);
Builders' Club of Chicago v. U. S., 58 F. (2d) 503 (Ct. Cl. 1932) (anti-labor union activities); Two-
Thirty-Three Club v. Welch, 2 F. Supp. 963 (S. D. Cal. 1932) (civic and philanthropic); The Cordon
v. U. S., 46 F. (2d) 719 (Ct. Cl. 1931) (art); Los Angeles City Club v. Welch, 44 F. (2d), 239 (S. D.
Cal. 1930) (civic); Cosmos Club v. U. S., 42 F. (2d) 321 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (educational); Washington Club
v. U. S., 49 F. (2d) 656 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (educational and cultural); Bankers' Club of America v. U. S.,
37 F. (2d) 982 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (meals for businessmen); Aldine Club v. U. S., 65 Ct. Cl. 315 (1928)
(businessmen's lunches); City Club of St. Louis v. U. S., 24 F. (2d) 743 (E. D. Mo. 1928) (civic);
Chemists' Club v. U. S., 64 Ct. Cl. 156 (1927) (scientific).
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club,74 but the mere possession or use of a gymnasium, swimming pool, or other
athletic facilities by a club whose exclusive or predominant purpose is religion or
philanthropic social service will not bring it within the taxable classy Although the
administrative application of this test has been contested before the courts in several
instances,"6 it is considerably easier to apply than the one relating to social clubs. A
health club, with elaborate facilities, is probably near the borderline, but it would
seem that it might well be classed as an athletic or sporting club. 7
From the standpoint of tax avoidance, a very important question is that of
whether a club can insulate its members from this tax by reorganizing into a cor-
poraton for profit, with the so-called members being relegated to the position of
mere privilege holders who have no interest in the club property and no voice in its
management. The argument in support of avoidance on this basis is that the dues
tax statute was intended to apply only with respect to clubs the members of which
have rights in the club property or at least a voice in the management or operation
of the facilities. In a recent case,78 the club was a corporation for profit, with its
stock closely held, and the playing members, who were limited in number, had no
interest in the club property and took no part in the management of the affairs of
the corporation. The contention was that, as the corporation was an organization
for profit, it could not be regarded as a social, athletic, or sporting club and that its
members were therefore immune from this tax. The court, pointing out the tax-
avoidance implications of such a contention, held that the members as a group, rather
than the corporation, constituted a sporting club and that their dues were taxable.
Apparently, then, the mere fact that the club is organized as, or reorganized into, a
corporation will not shield the members from tax; but if, under such circumstances,
there is no association or cooperation among the members toward a common objec-
tive, they will not be held to constitute such an organization.79
Differentiation between taxable dues and nontaxable fees is often extremely diffi-
cult. The statute 0 provides that the term "dues" includes assessments, regardless of
their purpose, but it sheds no light on the treatment to be accorded special, additional
fees or payments. Axn additional fee that is applicable to each member of a particular
class,81 or that is an incident to membership of a particular class,8 2 is taxable. More-
over, even though the fee is not an incident to the membership, if the obligation to
pay it continues until notice is given that the special privileges will no longer be used
and if the member is subject to expulsion for failure to pay it, as in the case of his
regular dues, the fee will be treated as dues. 3 But if the payment of the fee is
7
'U. S. Treas. Reg. 43 (1940) §1oi.39. 7 Ibid.
" Clubs held athletic or sporting: Bunker Hill Country Club v. U. S., 9 F. Supp. 52 (Ct. CL. 1934),
cert. denied, 296 U. S. 583 (1935); Camp Fire Club of America v. U. S., i F. Supp. 782 (Ct. CI, 1932);
Block Hall, Inc. v. U. S., 57 F. (2d) 9x8 (Ct. Cl. 1932). Contra: Arner v. Rogan, 404 C. C. . 9567
(S. D. Cal. 1940). " Cf. Arner v. Rogan, supra note 76.
7' Bunker Hill Country Club v. U. S., supra note 76.
SArner v. Rogan, supra note 76. " IrT. REv. CoDo §1712(a).
81 G. C. M . 7507, IX-2 C. B. 414 (1929).
8 2 Foran v. McLaughlin, 59 F. (2d) 158 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932).
'Hardt v. McLaughlin, 25 F. Supp. 684 (E. D. Pa. 1936); Merion Cricket Club v. U. S., 404
C. C. H. T9207 (E. D. Pa. 1940).
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optional, 4 or if the so-called assessment is actually voluntary, 5 the amount is not
taxable.
Initiation Fees
The tax"0 relating to initiation fees has been held to be an excise tax on the enjoy-
ment of a privilege.87 Prior to an amendatory"" definition of the term "initiation
fees," this tax was being avoided 9 by requiring new members to purchase a share
of stock or a bond in lieu of an ordinary initiation fee.90 The amendment provides
that such fees include any payment, contribution or loan required as a condition
precedent to membership, whether or not evidenced by a certificate of interest or
indebtedness or share of stock, and irrespective of the person or organization to whom
paid, contributed or loaned. It is immaterial that the stock91 or certificate 92 of mem-
bership is purchased from a retiring member by the new member and that the
payment is made to the retiring member rather than to the club itself. Moreover, the
payment of the fee need not be a condition precedent to membership of all classes;0 3
it is enough if it is required for one particular class.9 4 The constitutionality of this
tax has been contested and upheld.9 5
Life Memberships
The tax90 on life memberships has been variously described as a tax on the
privilege9 7 to share in the club facilities or on the enjoyment 98 of a privilege. Inas-
much as this tax applies whether or not the membership privileges are ever exer-
cised,0 9 it would be more precise to say that the tax is imposed simply with respect
to a person's having a life membership.Y00 Resignation or transfer of membership,
without more, is not sufficient to cut off further tax liability. It will continue until
the club accepts the resignation or recognizes the transfer.' 10 As may be supposed,
the application of this tax to life memberships acquired before the effective date of
"
4White v. Winchester Country Club, 117 F. (2d) 146 (C. C. A. ist, 1941); Williamson v. U. S., 12
F. Supp. 26 (W. D. N. C. 1934); Baltimore Country Club v. U. S., 7 F. Supp. 607 (D. Md. 1934); Weld
v. Nichols, 9 F. (2d) 977 (D. Mass. 1925).
"'Pendennis Club v. U. S., 20 F. Supp. 758 (W. D. Ky. 1937); Fresh Meadow Country Club v.
U. S., 17 F. Supp. 400 (E. D. N. Y. 1936); Garden City Golf Club v. Corwin, 62 F. (2d) 246 (C. C. A.
2d, 1932). "IN-r. REv. CODE §1710(a)(2).
"'Wing Lodge v. Blacklidge, 59 F. (2d) 421 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); Munn v. Bowers, 47 F. (2d)
204 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931), cert. denied, 283 U. S. 845 (1931). CI. S. T. 904, supra note 70.
" Revenue Act of x928, §413(a).
0 H. R. REP. No. 2, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1928) 26.
"
0 See Masonic Country Club of Western Michigan v. Holden, 18 F. (2d) 553 (C. C. A. 6th, 1927);
Derby v. U. S., 17 F. (2d) IX9 (Mass. 1927); Alliance Country Club v. U. S., 62 Ct. Cl. 579 (1926);
Luken v. U. S., 6z Ct. Cl. 598 (1926); Page v. U. S., 62 Ct. Cl. 590 (1926).
o
1 Wing Lodge v. Blacklidge, Munn v. Bowers, both supra note 87.
02 Knollwood Club v. U. S., 74 Ct. Cl. 1 (1931).
03 S. T. 387, I-2 C. B. 29r (1921). 94 Ibid.
" Wing Lodge v. Blacklidge, Munn v. Bowers, both supra note 87.
"I0 NT. REv. CODE §1710(a) (3).
IT Multnomah Athletic Club v. Huntley, 47 F. (ad) 352 (D. Ore. 1930).
" MacLaughlin v. Williams, 52 F. (2d) 724 (C. C. A. 3d, 1931), cert. denied, 284 U. S. 681 (1932).
See also McCaughn v. Williams, 23 F. (2d) 840 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1928), cert. denied, 276 U. S. 629 (i928).
"Multnomah Athletic Club v. Huntley, supra note 97.
100 Cf. INT. RV. CoDn §§4IO, 1520, s6oo. 101S. T. 684, XII-I C. B. 454 (1932).
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the statute has been contested on the grounds that the tax is a direct tax or is retro-
active. In view of the nature of the thing taxed, there is no basis for either of these
contentions.10 2
PLAYING CARDs AND SAFE DEPOSIT BoxEs
The administration of the statute imposing the tax 03 on playing cards does not
appear to be attended by any special difficulties. Nevertheless, as any person who
offers or exposes for sale playing cards to which revenue stamps are not affixed is
classed' 0 4 as a manufacturer and is accordingly under the duty to affix stamps thereto
upon sale, it is quite likely that there is some evasion of the tax, either through
ignorance or otherwise, particularly on the part of dubs and similar organizations
which repurchase and resell decks of cards. There seems to be no evidence that the
Bureau encounters any difficulty in the administration of the statute'0 5 which imposes
the tax with respect to safe deposit boxes.
ToBAcco, SNUFF, CIGARS, AND CIGARETTES
The taxes' 06 with respect to manufactured tobacco products date back, through
an unbroken period, to i862. 07 As the formative stage of these taxes has thus long
since been passed and as administrative officials and industry members, by virtue of
almost eighty years' experience, are thoroughly familiar with the requirements of the
law, present-day administration in this field is attended by a minimum of difficulties.
Despite the implications of the tax-imposing provisions'0" that (in the case of do-
mestic products, for example) the tax is on the manufacture and sale or removal or
on the sale or removal alone, it has been established 0 9, that the taxable transaction
is the manufacture or importation. Sale or removal from the factory or customs
house simply fixes the time for tax payment. This postponement of payment, it has
been said," 0 is designed to mitigate the burden on the manufacturer or importer.
A consequence of the nature of the taxable transaction is that tobacco products sold
by a manufacturer to a state are taxable; for in such a case the effects of the tax are
incidental, indirect, and permissible."' The stamps used in connection with the
payment of the tobacco taxes are not mere receipts evidencing prior payment of the
tax; they are actually the means, through affixation, of tax payment.1 2
The tobacco statute is unique among revenue measures in that it provides 13 that
no package of a manufactured product shall contain or have attached thereto any
paper, certificate, lottery ticket, or indecent or immoral picture. The validity of the
"'
2 Mulmomah Athletic Club v. Huntley, supra note 97; MacLaughlin v. Williams, McCaugbn v.
Williams, both supra note 98.
...INT. REV. CODE §§i8oo, x807. "'ld. §1831(a).
... Id. c. 12. ... Id. §2000.
""Act of July i, 186z. The tax in respect of cigarette papers and tubes imposed by INtr. REV. COa
§2ooo(d) was not, however, enacted until 1917. Revenue Act of 1917, §404.
' See INT. REv. CODE §2ooo(a)(c)(d).
'0' Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 299 U. S. 383 (937).
1 0 Ibid. 21 Ibid.
12'American Tobacco Co. v. U. S., 166 U. S. 468, 476, 477 (1897).
...INT. Rav. CODE §§2xoo(d), 2111(C).
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forerunner of this provision was vigorously assailed on the ground that, as the cou-
pons involved in that case'1 4 were of an inappreciable weight and therefore did not
interfere in any way with the determination of the tax base," 5 Congress had no
authority to prohibit their enclosure. The Court, however, held otherwise, saying
that Congress had full power to prescribe that a package required to bear a revenue
stamp shall contain only the taxable article.
OLEOMARGARINE
A purpose of the oleomargarine taxes,' 6 which can scarcely be characterized as
secondary, is to discourage, by heavier taxation,' - 7 the manufacture of colored
oleomargarine" 8 in order to reduce the opportunities for its fraudulent distribution
to the public as butter and also to assure, by the branding requirements," 9 that
taxpaid oleomargarine cannot readily be sold as butter. Available evidence indicates
that this purpose has been substantially achieved. While this statement does not
mean that the production of colored oleomargarine has been suppressed,' 20 it is true
that the trade is principally confined to uncolored oleomargarine.' 2' The tax' 22 on
that product is so low that it probably has not retarded or adversely affected the
trade. The Supreme Court, early upholding the constitutionality of these taxes,128
declared that if a tax is within the lawful power of Congress, the exercise of that
power may not be judicially restrained because of the results to arise therefrom, and
that it would not inquire into the motive or purpose of Congress in enacting these
taxes.'1 4 Although classification problems have arisen in the past' 2 5 it would appear
that recent amendments' 26 have largely removed the grounds for such controversies.
On the other hand, problems frequently arise under the provision' 27 denominating
as a manufacturer any person who adds to or mixes with oleomargarine a substance
that gives it a yellow color and supplies it to others. In some instances, as where
the person is the proprietor of a boarding house, it is clear that the violations occur
through ignorance, but in others it is equally clear that the offender had full
knowledge of the requirements of the law' 28
114 Felsenheld v. U. S., x86 U. S. 126 (x9o2).
... The tax base is quantitative. See INT. REv. CODE §2000.
... IN. REv. CODE §§2301(a)(i), 2306. ... Id. §:3oI(a)(I).
118 For definition of colored oleomargarine, see id. §2301(a)(2).
I" Id. §§23o2(b)(2)(3), 2304(b), 23o6; and also U. S. Treas. Reg. No. 9 (1936) arts. 29, 54, and 8o.
... During the fiscal year r940, 1,859,931 pounds of colored oleomargarine were produced. RP.
COM'R INT. REV. (1940) 26.
.. The production of uncolored oleomargarine for the fiscal year 194 o amounted to 301,857,570
pounds. Ibid. "'2INT. REv. CODE §2301(a) (I).
113 McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27 (1904). 12& Id. at 59.
... Product taxable: National Foods v. U. S., 13 F. Supp. 364 (Ct. Cl. x936), cert. denied, 299 U. S.
544 (936); Harrow-Taylor Butter Co. v. Crooks, 41 F. (2d) 627 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930); John F. Jelke
Co. v. U. S., 63 Ct. Cl. 370 (1927); Win. J. Moxley v. Hertz, 2x6 U. S. 344 (1910); Cliff v. U. S., 195 U. S.
159 (1904). Product not taxable: Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co., 284 U. S. 498 (932); Foley v.
Miller, 24 F. (2d) 722 (S. D. Ohio 1928); Higgins Manufacturing Co. v. Page, 297 Fed. 644 (D. R. I.
1924); Braun & Fitts v. Coyne, 125 Fed. 331 (N. D. Ill. x899).
"0 Act of July io, 1930, §1, 46 STAT. 1022 (definition of oleomargarine), and Act of Mar. 4, 1931, §2,
46 STAT. 1549 (determination of yellowness). These amendments are found in INr. REv. CODE §§23oo and
2301 (a) (2), respectively. " INT. Rlv. CODE §2302(a).
128 Discussion of the closely related taxes on adulterated butter, process or renovated butter, filled cheese
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NARcoTics
The administration of the narcotic laws,129 from the standpoint of their enforce.
ment, is vested in the Bureau of Narcotics, while the Bureau of Internal Revenue is
concerned primarily with tax collections, adjustments, and compromises. Enforce-
ment problems encountered by the Bureau of Narcotics are outside the scope of this
paper.
The narcotic taxes apply to narcotic drugs,13 0 smoking opium,18 and mari-
huana.' 32 Although the statutes imposing these taxes are regulatory in purpose and
effect, the yield 133 from the tax on narcotic drugs is quite considerable, as such drugs
are extensively used in the field of medicine. On the other hand, the requirements'3 4
of the smoking-opium statute are such that apparently noione has ever qualified as a
manufacturer thereunder, and the collections'"3 under the marihuana tax are so
insignificant as to indicate that lawful traffic in marihuana is very restricted.
Subject to certain exceptions, narcotic drugs may be transferred only in pursuance
of a written order from the transferee, prepared on a form furnished by the Govern-
ment.136 The exceptions include registered physicians"8 7 dispensing such drugs to
their patients in the course of their professional practice, and dealers' 88 transferring
such drugs to consumers under prescriptions issued by registered physicians. More-
over, the forms for such orders may be issued only to persons who have registered
and paid tax under the occupational tax statute. 3 9 The validity of the order require-
ments has been upheld by the Supreme Court in two famous cases.140 These
requirements tend to keep the traffic aboveboard, subject to inspection by Govern-
ment agents, and to diminish the opportunity of unauthorized persons to obtain the
drugs and sell them clandestinely without paying the tax.' 41 Thus, there was no
basis for the contention that such requirements had nothing to do with facilitating
the collection of revenue.142 Furthermore, as the legislation had some reasonable
relation to the exercise of the taxing power, the supposed motives which induced it
were not grounds for its invalidation.'
4
The requirement' 44 in the smoking-opium statute that the manufacturer must
and mixed flour is omitted in the interest of space. The taxes on coconut and other vegetable oils are
omitted as not falling within the definable limits of consumption taxation. See Studenski, Characteristics,
Developments and Present Status of Consumption Taxes, supra this issue, for an attempt to define the
field. So also of thd taxes on firearms. Cf. discussion of bituminous coal taxes, infra.
12D INT. REV. CODE C. 23. "' Id. §2550(a).
1311d. §2567(a). .. Id. §259o(a).
... Collections, including occupational taxes, for the fiscal year 1940 were $6o5,395.66. REP. Coma't
INT. REv. (1940) 25. "'lINT. REv. CODE §§2567(a), 2569(b) (c) (d).
.. Collections, including occupational taxes, for the fiscal year 1940 were $4,702.6o. REP. Coma'n INT.
REV. (1940) 25.
... Ir. RLv. CODE §2554. Cf. id. §2591, requiring orders for transfers of marihuana.
"ar Id. §2554(c) ().
"38 1d. §2554(c)(2). "'D Id. §2554(f).
"40 U. S. v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86 (1919); Nigro v. U. S., 276 U. S. 332 (1928).
"' See U. S. v. Doremus, supra note 140.
14m Ibid. 24 Ibid.
144 INT. REv. CODE §2569(c).
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be a citizen has been upheld.145 The Constitution does not require Congress to
extend such privilege to a noncitizen.148 Another case' 47 under this statute is an
object lesson for all taxing authorities. Regulations implementing the general re-
quirements of a destructive tax measure are as necessary as similar regulations under
a statute designed solely for revenue purposes. Unless such requirements are so
implemented, there is no way that compliance may be had with them and con-
sequently they may be disregarded with impunity.148
WHITE PHOSPHORUS MATCHES
The original purpose of the statute' 49 with respect to white phosphorus matches,
which was to suppress the production of poisonous matches, has long since been
completely accomplished, as there have been no manufacturers of these matches
and no collections under this statute for many years. The use of white phosphorus
in the manufacture of matches caused necrosis, or "phossy jaw," a painful and dis-
figuring disease, while the matches themselves were efficient instruments of self-
destruction and a constant menace to children. The humanitarian action by the
company which controlled the use of a harmless substitute, in surrendering its letters
patent to the Government, now enables all manufacturers to use this compound
without payment of royalties.
LIQUOR
Although the liquor taxes' 50 produce well over one-half billion dollars per year,151
the provisions imposing such taxes are at the same time highly regulatory, both in
purpose and effect. But, here, regulation is resorted to primarily as a true incident of
the taxing power rather than to accomplish a nonrevenue purpose; that is, the regula-
tion is designed to protect the revenue and to facilitate its collection. Nevertheless,
in view of the great extent to which the liquor industry is subjected to rigid, detailed
statutory provisions and voluminous regulations, and the litigious disposition of
many a businessman chafing under governmental regulation regardless of its pur-
pose, it might be supposed that the administration of the liquor laws is accompanied
by a ceaseless flow o administrative rulings and by interminable litigation. The
remarkable fact, however, is that the lawful or qualified industry members, almost
without exception, follow the letter of the law and the exceedingly detailed regula-
tions down to the last bitter period. The explanation of this phenomenon would
seem to be more involved than in the case of the tobacco taxes. Undoubtedly it is
due in part to the fact that the taxpayers, through many years of experience, are
thoroughly familiar with the requirements of the law and regulations. It is probably
due mainly, however, to a feeling on their part that they are on probation and that
14
= Lee Mow Lin v. U. S., 25o Fed. 695 (C. C. A. 8th, x918), cert. denied, 247 U. S. 518 (1918).
1401Ibid.
" Chin Sing v. U. S., 227 Fed. 397 (C. C. A. 7th, 1915).
24s Ibid." - ' INT. REV. CODE c. 24. ... Id. §§2800, 3030, 3150.
... Collections for the fiscal year 1940, including occupational taxes, were $624,253,156.11. REP. Co01'eR
INT. REv. (1940) I, 2.
638 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
it is definitely to their interests to meet all demands of the Government without
protest or resistance.
The major problem in this field is an enforcement problem having to do with
illicit producers of distilled spirits. These persons, who carry on their operations
entirely outside the law, fall into two principal classes--"moonshiners" in remote,
mountainous regions, and remnants of the Prohibition-era gangs in the larger cities.
The serious proportions of this problem are clearly indicated by statistics as to seizures
and arrests. 152 Nevertheless, the Government is making definite headway in its
effort to suppress the illicit production of distilled spirits. Compared with the fiscal
year 1939, still seizures decreased ii.6 per cent, mash seizures 19.8 per cent, and
arrests ii.i per cent in I94O." Enforcement progress is further evidenced by mash
seizures during the past five years, which decreased 67 per cent.' 4 A very effective
weapon is afforded the Government by the provision 35 requiring dealers in raw
materials for the production of distilled spirits to furnish the Government with the
names and addresses of persons to whom such materials are distributed. In the
fiscal year 1940, information furnished by such dealers led to the seizure of more
than 500 illicit distilleries and 15o vehicles, and to more than 70o arrests" 0
MANUFAcTURERS' ExcisEs
The manufacturers' excise taxes' 57 are imposed upon various classes of articles'58
sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, or, in the case of electrical energy,
by the vendor. Moreover, these taxes apply, by reason of sections other than the
tax-imposing provisions, to leases' 5 9 of such articles and to the use'10 thereof by
manufacturers, producers, or importers. The language of the tax-imposing provisions
has in the past occasioned some uncertainty as to the precise nature of the taxable
transaction. An early interpretation' 1 was that such transaction was the manufacture
of the article. A later contention' 62 had it that the transaction consisted in the
manufacture (or production or importation) and the sale of the article. The present
view,1 63 resulting from a decision'0 4 of the Supreme Court, is that where a sale, for
example, is involved, the transaction is simply the sale. The payment of these taxes
is required to be made by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, or, in the case
of electrical energy, by the vendor.1 65
.52 During the fiscal year 1940, investigators seized zo,663 stills, with an aggregate mash capacity of
1,653,775 gallons; 6,480,240 gallons of mash; 264,594 gallons of spirits; and 4,523 automobiles and trucks.
This property totaled an aggregate appraised value of over $2,ooo,ooo dollars. In the same period, 25,638
persons were arrested. Id. at 34.
153 Ibid. 154 Ibid.
... IpTN. REv. CODE §2811. ... REP. CoM'R Ir. REv. (1940) 34.
"
5 7 TNT. REV. CODE C. 29-A. The sugar tax, while levied on manufacture rather than sale, is treated for
most purposes as a manufacturers' excise. The principal difference arises with respect to sales to govern-
mental bodies. See note 272, infra.
... These articles are specified in id. §§3400-3413. 59 Id. §3440.
.. Id. §3444. 101 31 Op. Arr'y GEN. (I919) 520.
"'Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., 283 U. S. 570, 574 (193).
2 6
sU. S. Treas. Reg. 46 (1940) §§316.3o, 316.40, 316.50, 36.70, 316.8o.
"', Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., supra note 162.
..
5 See U. S. Treas. Reg. 46 (1940) §36.3; id. 44 (1939) §314.3; id. 42 (1932) art. 41, c. v, as
amended by T. D. 4393.
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Tires and Inner Tubes
The tax'6 6 relating to tires and inner tubes is measured by the weight of the
article. Although this weight basis operates fairly in most instances, its application
to tires for children's vehicles such as wagons and scooters is somewhat inequitable.
In the case of such tires the tax may well equal nearly one-half their cost, whereas the
tax on automobile tires is obviously a much smaller percentage of their cost. As this
tax applies to tires for any vehicle,' 67 all tires are taxable unless the thing on which
they are mounted is incapable of use as a means of transporting a person or burden. 6 s
A question that has caused some difficulty in connection with the administration
of the statute imposing this tax is whether retreaded tires are subject to taxation.
Formerly, the Bureau's position 16 9 with respect to this matter was that if the retread-
ing operation destroyed the original identity of the tire, the process was manufac-
turing or production and the tire was taxable' 70 Recently, however, the Bureau has
abandoned this position in favor of another test developed judicially' 7 ' in respect of
automobile parts produced from junk material. Under the new test, if a person
produces a tire from scrap, salvage, or junk material by processing, manipulating, or
changing the form of the article or by combining or assembling two or more articles,
he is a manufacturer and the tire so produced is taxable.' 72 Another question arising
under the statute imposing this tax is whether a mileage contract is a lease.' 73 Under
such a contract the tire manufacturer supplying the tires retains tide thereto and
agrees to service them during the term of the contract, while the bus company agrees
to pay for the use of the tires at a specified rate per mile and to purchase them at
the end of the contract at the list price, less the mileage amount theretofore paid
under the contract. Such a contract has been ruled to be a lease for the purposes of
this tax and the tires furnished thereunder declared taxable,17 4 the tax liability being
incurred upon the delivery of the tires.' 75
Toilet Preparations
One of the chief difficulties in connection with administering the statute imposing
the tax'176 on toilet preparations has been the determination, in special instances, of
who is the manufacturer. If M Company arranges to have a product manufactured
by X Company according to its specification and for sale under its name,' 7 7 or if it
furnishes ingredients for a product to be manufactured for it by Y Company,1'7
... INT. REv. CODE §3400.
'107 S. T. 66o, XII-i C. B. 385 (1932). Cf. S. T- 465, XI-2 C. B. 454 (93).
108 Ibid.
lea S. T. 8x2, XIV-i C. B. 4o6 (1934); S. T. 648, XII-a C. B. 384 (1932).
1 CI. Skinner v. U. S., 8 F. Supp. 999 (S. D. Ohio 1934). Although the court in this case employed
broad language to the effect that the tax is limited to new tires, the actual decision was not inconsistent
with the Bureau's earliest test, as the original identity of the tires there involved had not in fact been
destroyed.
... Clawson & Balls v. Harrison, io8 F. (2d) 991 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
m U. S. Treas. Reg. 46 (1940) §316.4. See also S. T. 896, 1940-1 C. B. 252.
isa See INT. REV. CODE §3440.
114 G. C. M. 11410, XII-i C. B. 382 (1932); S. T. 496, M-2 C. B. 455 (1931).
'n S. T. 496, supra note X74. .. IN~r. Rav. CoDE §3401.
a
7 7 G. C. M. 16223, XV-1 C. B. 380 (1935)- ... G. C. M. 11522, XII-1 C. B. 387 (932).
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M Company is deemed to be the manufacturer of the product. On the other hand,
if N Company buys a product from A Company and packages it itself under its
trade name,17 9 or if it buys a product manufactured and packed for it by B Com-
pany,180 or if it merely furnishes the containers for a product to be manufactured
for it by C Company,' S N Company is held not to be the manufacturer of the
product. A druggist may treat as exempt from this tax a preparation compounded
by him pursuant to a prescription, as it is assumed that a bona fide prescription is
written for medical purposes.' 8 2 But where the physician specifies on the prescrip-
tion that the preparation is for toilet purposes, the druggist is regarded as the manu-
facturer.' 8 3 Beauty shops and barber shops are permitted to add water to a taxpaid
toilet preparation without incurring liability as a manufacturer, if such addition is
made as part of the business of rendering personal service to their patrons.'8 4 How-
ever, if the addition of water is in any such case done for the purpose of preparing the
article for sale rather than use in business, the shop is held to be a manufacturer.' 5
This tax, being applicable solely to sales made by manufacturers, producers, or
importers, operates with discriminatory effects that probably were not within the
contemplation of Congress. A manufacturer who produces and sells products in
bulk naturally makes his sales on a much lower price level than does a manufacturer
producing and packaging his product. As this tax is based on price rather than
quantity, the first manufacturer bears a much lighter tax burden than the second. It
scarcely needs to be pointed out that certain manufacturers have taken advantage of
this situation to minimize their taxes. In order to safeguard the revenue and to
obviate the inequity under consideration, it might well be advisable to extend this
tax to persons who package toilet preparations in the form in which they are sold
to consumers, whether or not such persons are the actual producers.
The statute provides that the price of toilet peparations shall include, among other
items, any charge for coverings and containers, if furnished by the actual manufac-
turer.'88 Questions have arisen as to whether certain special containers of cosmetics,
such as cigarette and vanity cases, are taxable. Formerly, the test used by the Bureau
in these cases was the comparative value of the cosmetics and the container.' 87 The
present test, however, is that of the dominant or primary purpose of the container.' 8
Under this test, if the container, no matter how valuable, serves no useful purpose
other than as a covering, the charge therefor is includible in the tax basis.
As may be supposed, the Bureau has frequently encountered problems involving
the classification of products for the purposes of this tax. It has been ruled that
taxable products include preparations to cover birth marks,189 baby powder,' 90
170 Williams v. Harrison, ixo F. (2d) 989 (C. C. A. 7th, 1940).
100Charles Marchand Co. v. Higgins, 36 F. Supp. 792 (S. D. N. Y. 1940). See also G. C. M.
11522, supra note 178.
...G. C. M. 11522, supra note 578. 182S. T. 478, XI-2 C. B. 456 (193).31bid. 'S. T. 825, XV-* C. B. 382 (1935).
18t Ibid. lsMINT. REv. Coos §3401-
187 S. T. 559, XI-2 C. B. 459 (931). ... S. T. 8x5, XIV-2 C. B. 365 (1934).
1
s
0G. C. M. o96o, XI-2 C. B. 458 (1930- 11 S. T. 693, X11-2 C. B. 312 (1932).
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hydrogen peroxide,191 permanent-waving solutions, 9 2 and cocoa butter. 93 On the
other hand, this tax has been held not to apply to a germicidal solution'9 4 or to styptic
pencils. 19" If an article may be used both for medicinal and toilet purposes, it is
taxable, irrespective of its chief use.1 9 6
Parts and Accessories, Automobile and Truck Bodies, etc.
The tax 97 with respect to parts and accessories has given rise to considerable
litigation and numerous administrative rulings. The principal difficulties have to do
with the question whether a person who produces parts from scrap, salvage, or junk
material is a manufacturer and with the classification of articles as taxable or non-
taxable. The earlier test' 98 with regard to the first problem was whether the
processing operations destroyed the original identity of the article. That test was
superseded in 194o by an entirely different test' 9 9 based on a 1939 decision 200 of the
circuit court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The position of the Bureau at
present in regard to this problem is that if a person produces a part from scrap,
salvage, or junk material by processing, manipulating, or changing the form of an
article or by combining or assembling two or more articles, he is a manufacturer and
the article so produced is taxable. Nevertheless, there are indications that the
foundation of the new test is as yet none too secure, for on at least two occasions
district courts have refused to follow it.20 1
The task of delimiting the field of taxable parts and accessories by the case-by-case
method was considerably facilitated by the provision 202 in the Revenue Act of 1932
that spark plugs, storage batteries,203 leaf springs, coils,204 timers, 20 5 and tire
chains,20 6 suitable for use on automobiles, trucks, taxable tractors, or motorcycles,
are to be considered parts or accessories. The extent to which the case-by-case method
has been used and the results obtained are indicated by the partial list of recent
decisions and rulings set forth in the margin.20 7 While the boundaries of this area
1.. Peroxide Chemical Co. v. Sheehan, io8 F. (2d) 306 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939).
.
02 Duradene Co. v. Magruder, 21 F. Supp. 426 (Md. 1937), al'd, 95 F. (2d) 999 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938); S. T. 818, XIV-2 C. B. 366 (1934). 1.. S. T. 506, XI-2 C. B. 457 (1931).
'o' Sharp & Dohme v. Ladner, 82 F. (2d) 733 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1936).
' S. T. 497, I-2 C. B. 457 (i93i)
'°S. T. 655, XII-I C. B. 390 (1932). "'INT. REV. CODE §3403(c).
10S. T. 648, XII-i C. B. 384 (932); S. T. 812, XIV-i C. B. 406 (x934).
'
9 0 U. S. Treas. Reg. 46 (1940) §316.4. See also S. T. 896, 1940-1 C. B. 252.
.oo Clawson & Balls v. Harrison, supra note 171. Accord: U. S. v. Armature Exchange, 1i6 F. (2d)
969 (C. C. A. 9th, 194).
... Moroley Bearing Service of Oakland, Ltd. v. U. S., 404 C. C. H. 96i9 (N. D. Cal. 1940); J. Leslie
Morris Co. v. U. S., 404 C. C. H. 96o8 (S. D. Cal. 1940).
"O Revenue Act of 1932, §6o6(e), now INT. REv. CODE §3403(c). The Revenue Acts of 1918,
§900(3), 1921, §900(3), and 1924, §6oo(3), contained no such provision.
203 Cf. United States Light & Heat Corp. v. U. S., 3 F. Supp. 861 (Ct. Cl. 1933), cert. denied, 291
U. S. 67r 0934).
50' Cf. Atwater Kent Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 62 C. Cl. 419 (1926).
... Cf. Advance Automobile Accessories Corp. v. U. S., 42 F. (2d) 595 (Ct. Cl. 1930); Berg Brothers
Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 67 Ct. Cl. 165 (1929); Atwater Kent Mfg. Co. v. U. S., supra note 204.
210 Cf. American Chain Co. v. Hartford-Connecticut Fruit Co., 86 F. (2d) 1o5 (C. C. A. 2d, 1936).
'"
7 Held taxable as parts or accessories: Rochester Woven Belting Corp. v. U. S., 43 F. (2d) 264 (Ct.
Cl. 1930) (transmission lining); Walker Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 65 Ct. Cl. 394 (1928) (jacks); Hinsdale Mfg.
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have thus been partly marked out, classification controversies will probably continue
for some time, though in diminishing volume.
In sharp contrast to the situation involving parts and accessories, the taxes208 on
motorcycles and on automobile and truck bodies and chassis occasion few difficulties.
The term "manufacturer" does not include an automobile dealer who makes changes
in an automobile at the request of the purchaser, if such changes do not affect the
car's use.20 9 A hearse chassis2 10 is classified as a truck chassis, but fire trucks21 1
are not within the purview of this tax. It has also been ruled 212 that a tank for a
tank truck should be classified as a truck body. So-called "drive-away" sales have raised
a question as to exportation. If an automobile or truck, delivered at the factory, is
driven to Canada or Mexico or to a port for loading aboard ship and is not used for
any other purpose on such trip, and if the time intervening between the delivery and
arrival at the border or port of export is devoted to reaching that point, the vehicle
will be considered as having been exported in due course and therefore as not
taxable.213
Co. v. U. S., 43 F. (2d) 263 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (socket wrenches); Fairmont Tool & Forging Co. v. U. S.,
42 F. (2d) 591 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (tool kits); S. T. 643, XII-i C. B. 397 (1930) (auto radios); Bassick Mfg.
CO. v. U. S., 44 F. (2d) 278 (Ct. CL. 1930) (grease guns); S. T. 739, XIII-1 C. B. 378 (1933) (floor
mats); United States Gear Corp. v. U. S., 15 F. Supp. 66 (Ct. Cl. 1936) (differential, pinion, ring, and
transmission gears); Brown Sheet Iron & Steel CO. v. Willcuts, 45 F. (2d) 390 (C. C. A. 8th, 1930), atJ'g
34 F. (2d) 969 (D. Minn. 1929) (steel tanks for use on trucks); S. T. 441, 11-1 C. B. 461 (1923)
(hoists for trucks); E. Edeleman & Co. v. U. S., 68 Ct. Cl. 168 (1929) (clocks and window antirattlers);
Autoquip Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 68 Ct. Cl. 362 (1929) (hand pump and antirattlers); Weir v. McGrath, 52
F. (2d) 2o (S. D. Ohio 1928) (carburetors); Imperial Brass Mfg. Co. v. U. S., 69 Ct. Cl. 20 (1929)
(carburetor controls, primers, gasoline strainers, and air pumps); Eskstrom v. U. S., 21 F. Supp. 338
(Ct. Cl. 1937) (universal joints); S. T. 824, XIV-2 C. B. 368 (I934) (various articles cut from lengths
or rolls of material and held in stock for sale); S. T. 573, XI-2 C. B. 473 (93) (battery cables, ignition
cable sets, battery box hold-downs, and ignition wires cut into required lengths); Crawford Mfg. Co. v.
U. S., 50 F. (2d) 280 (Ct. Cl. 1931) (top covers, back curtains, and seat and floor coverings); S. T.
605, XI2 C. B. 475. (193) (windshield glass cut to size, wind wing brackets, rear vision mirrors, and
headlight lenses cut from antiglare or beam refracting glass); G. C. M. 11249, XI-2 C. B. 474 (1931)
(parts for taxable parts and accessories); S. T. 760, XIII-2 C. B. 405 (1933) (metal base for solid tires);
S. T. 6o6, XI-2 C. B. 476 (193') (taximeters); S. T. 834, XV-I C. B. 396 (935) (baby auto seats, auto
beds, and auto hammocks); S. T. 736, XIII-i C. B. 377 (1933) ("six wheel attachment"). Held non-
taxable as parts or accessories: Wecks v. U. S., 42 F. (2d) 325 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (supercarburetor); NV. M.
Dutton & Sons Co. v. U. S., 59 F. (2d) 839 (Ct. Cl. 1932) (hand pump); Frost Gear & Forge Co. v.
U. S., 52 F. (2d) 1023 (Ct. Cl. 1931) (pinion, ring, differential, and transmission gears); Cuno Engineer-
ing Corp. v. U. S., 43 F. (2d) 259 (Ct. Cl. 1930) (electric cigar lighters, and combination lighters and
ash receivers); Durkee-Atwood Co. v. Willcuts, 83 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) (belts); Martin
Rocking Fifth Wheel Co. v. U. S., 6o Ct. Cl. 466 (1925) (semitrailers); Eskstrom v. U. S., 21 F. Supp.
338 (Ct. Cl. 1937) (jumbo transmissions); S. T. 573, XI-2 C. B. 473 (193) (wrcking cranes for
trucks, towing cradles, reboring machines, valve refacing machines, valve grinders, air compressors, paint
sprayers, bushings, ball bearings, waterproof cement, paints, lacquers, and gasket cement); S. T. 6o5,
XI-2 C. B. 475 (193I) (headlight lenses cut from plain glass).
o'
8 INT. REv. CODE §3403(a), (b).
20 J. W. Cox Motor Sales Co. v. Goodcell, 5 F. Supp. 63o (S. D. Cal. 1933).
.21 G. C. M. 12068, XII-2 C. B. 314 (1932).
... Amerian-.aFrance Fire Engine Co. v. Riordan, 6 F. (2d) 964 (C. C. A. 2d, 1925); S. T. 626,
XII-i C. B- 387 (1933).
212S. T. 468, XI-2 C. B. 471 (i931). ...S. T. 833, XV-s C. B. 418 (1935).
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Radio Sets
The tax21 4 relating to radio receiving sets actually applies to the components
enumerated in the statute215 rather than to the complete set itself. A result of this
scheme of taxation is that, in particular instances, determination of liability by the
taxpayer is beset with difficulties, and auditing of such determination by agents of the
Bureau is unduly burdensome. Ordinarily, radio chassis and cabinet are made by
different persons; the assembler of the complete set is the manufacturer of the chassis.
Of course, if the assembler bills each taxable component separately, difficulties are
avoided. But if he sells the set for a lump sum, he is compelled to allocate the total
sales price of the taxable components between those which he manufactured himself
and those which he purchased taxpaid, and to satisfy the Bureau that the allocation
was proper.2 16 Unless he can do this, he is required to pay tax on all the taxable com-
ponents.2 1 7 A solution to this problem would be to broaden this tax, as in the case
of automobiles and parts and accessories, to cover complete sets in addition to the
components now specified in the law. Although the adoption of this suggestion
would reduce the difficulties involved in calculating the tax, it would substantially
increase the tax burden, for the sales price of an assembled set, which includes cost
of assembly, assembler's profits, and small parts not now taxable, is higher than the
aggregate of the sales prices of the components.
Without any apparent justification the law draws a distinction between com-
ponents for auto radios and components for other radios. A manufacturer may with-
out payment of tax sell the former for use in the manufacturing of complete auto-
mobile sets taxable as accessories, 21-8 whereas he may not sell components for other
types of radio, without payment of tax, for use as material or as a component part
of a radio chassis.2P 9 Furthermore, components for auto radios are taxed at a lower
rate than that applicable to components for other radios 220
Household Refrigerators, Firearms and Ammunition, Matches
Available information indicates that the Bureau has not encountered any par-
ticular difficulties in the administration of the statutory provisions imposing the
taxes in respect of household refrigerators, 221 firearms,2  shells, 2 2 3 cartridges,2 24 and
matches.2 25 Recently, however, an administrative ruling221 relating to shells and
cartridges has been successfully assailed in a district court 2 2 7 An exemption pro-
vision 22 8 provides that no tax shall apply to the sale of an article for use by the vendee
as material in the manufacture of, or as a component part of, an article subject to
the manufacturers' excise taxes. The assailed ruling provides that where a manufac-
INT. REv. CODE §3404. 21t Ibid.S. T. 875, 1938-2 C. B. 396. 217Tbid.
...INT. REv. CODE §3403(c); S. T. 875, supra note 216.
211 S. T. 875, supra note 216. "' See INT. RFv. CODE §§3403, 3404.
221 Id. §3405. 22 Id. §3407.
223 Ibid. 4 Ibid.
2 5d. §3409. 2" S. T. 551, XI-2 C. B. 483 (93x).
"
2 Western Cartridge Co. v. Smith, 404 C. C. H. 9818 (D. Conn. 1940).
221 INT. REV. CODE §3442(l).
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turer of shells and cartridges sells such articles to a firearms manufacturer for use in
testing his firearms, the sale does not come within the exemption, the reasoning being
that the ammunition cannot properly be said to have been used as material in the
manufacture of, or as a component part of, the firearms so tested. The federal court,
stating that the ruling was at variance with the plain language of the statute, held
that the ammunition had been used as a material in the manufacture of firearms.
Electrical Energy
The tax 220 in respect of electrical energy applies only to sales for domestic or
commercial consumption and not to sales for resale. It thus discriminates against
commercial as compared with industrial users. Moreover, since it does not apply
to sales made by publicly-owned electric and power plants,2 0 or to states or their
political subdivisions,2 1 it discriminates against private enterprise. Although the
latter statement holds true as a general proposition, a recent amendment28 2 neces-
sitates a qualification to the effect that this tax has no application to sales by rural
electrification cooperatives or nonprofit corporations. This amendment was obviously
made in furtherance of the Government's commendable rural electrification pro-
gram. In view of the scope of the tax, classification problems as to use have been
inevitable. A partial list of recent classification rulings is set forth in the margin.288
It may be supposed that those buying from power companies have attempted evasion
by asserting that their use of energy is industrial. Probably this type of evasion is
carried out successfully in numerous instances, for power companies are largely
229 d. §3411.
230 Ibid. 2" G. C. M. 13754, XIII-2 C. B. 408 (x933).
232 Revenue Act of 1938, §713(a), now INT. REv. CoDE §3411(c).
232 Use held to be commercidal or domestic: S. T. 909, 1940-, C. B. 309 (churches, convents, charita-
ble organizations, and nonprofit educational institutions, if use is actually domestic or commercial); S. T.
892, 1939-2 C. B. 360 (repair shop, lighting hand laundry, tailor shop, physician's office); S. T. 674,
XII-i C. B. 412 (932) (cemetery garage); S. T. 652, XII-I C. B. 411 (932), (chain store warehouses);
S. T. 650, XII-i C. B. 411 (1932) (furnished by Government for specific charge for use by federal em-
ployees in living quarters); S. T. 637, XII-I C. B. 4o9 (2932) (dairy producing milk for retail purposes);
S. T. 695, XII-2 C. B. 324 (1932) (general farming operations); S. T. 615, XI-2 C. B. 504 (1931) (cold
storage warehouse); S. T. 576, XI-2 C. B. 5o2 (193) (radio broadcasting station operated for entertain-
ment purposes); S. T. 562, XI-2 C. B. 5oi (1931) (hospital operated for profit); S. T. 544, XI.2 C. B.
500 (1931) (church rectory); S. T. 527, XI-2 C. B. 499 (193) (grain elevator where grain stored for
resale or for account of producer); S. T. 525, XI-2 C. B. 499 (193) (branch house of meat packer used
for refrigeration, storage, or distribution); S. T. 518, XI-2 C. B. 498 (1931) (branch office of dairy);
S. T. 466, XI-2 C. B. 497 (931) (motion picture theater); S. T. 464, XI-2 C. B. 496 (193)x (outdoor
advertising); S. T. 463, XI-2 C. B. 496 (193) (branch office of laundry); S. T. 569, XI-2 C. B. Sot
(931) (scavenger company operating under contract with city). Use held not to be commercial or
domestic: S. T. 892, 1939-2 C. B. 360 (clothing manufacturer; printing establishment; maker of Christmas
cards); S. T. 641, XII-I C. B. 40o (932) (closed industrial plants); S. T. 695, XII-2 C. B. 324 (1932)
(irrigation purposes on farm); S. T. 483, XI-2 C. B. 497 (931) (railroad dock facilities for loading and
unloading ships); S. T. 570, X-2 C. B. 502 (1931) (nonprofit agricultural fair); S. T. 535, XI-2 C. B.
500 (193) (nonprofit institution for promotion of knowledge and service in industry); S. T. 545, XI-2
C. B. 500 (1931) (bus company for operations as common carrier); S. T. 576, XI-2 C. B. 502 (2931) (radio
broadcasting station owned and operated by educational or religious institution for broadcasting educational
or religious programs; regular activities of nonprofit schools, colleges, and universities); S. T. 562, XI-2
C. B. 5O (i93i) (nonprofit hospital); S. T. 527, XI-2 C. B. 499 (1931) (grain elevator where grain
cleaned, ground, and bleached); S. T. 525, XI-2 C. B. 499 (932) (branch house of meat packer used for
processing meat); S. T. 518, XI-2 C. B. 498 (1932) (pasteurization and bottling milk, and manufacture of
butter, buttermilk, and cottage cheese); S. T. 463, MI-2 C. B. 496 (1931) (laundry plant).
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dependent upon their customers for information as to use and the task of investigat-
ing each case is administratively infeasible. It is plain that the discriminatory effects
of this tax could be eliminated only by extending its coverage to all sales regardless
of the type of use and by restricting exemptions to sales to governmental bodies.
Gasoline
The basis for the gasoline tax is quantitative.2 3 4 As gasoline prices fluctuate
almost daily, because of price wars, unfair competition by so-called bootleggers dealing
in contraband gasoline, and similar practices, the quantity basis for tax measurement
is more equitable to the members of this industry than would be a price measure.
Moreover, this basis greatly simplifies the administration of the statutory provisions
relating to this tax; in turn, those provisions do not give rise to serious classification
or other administrative difficulties. Furthermore, tax evasion appears to be a minor
problem in this field. Industry members, well organized into associations for policing
the industry against unfair competitive practices, find it definitely to their interest
promptly to report instances of tax evasion to the Government.
Lubricating Oil
A quantity basis3 5 for measuring liability is also provided for the tax2 " relating
to lubricating oil. The reasons for the adoption of such a basis are substantially the
same as in the case of the gasoline tax. Also, in view of the fact that the major
members of this industry are well organized to police the industry, tax evasion is not
a serious problem, though the Bureau has found instances in which either oil later
used for lubrication has been sold tax free under certificates ostensibly for nonlubrica-
tion purposes or lubricating oil has been sold as nontaxable grease.
As the statutory provisions relating to this tax do not define the terms "manufac-
turer," "producer," and "lubricating oils," classification problems have arisen in the
course of their administration. A person who merely blends or mixes two or more
different grades of lubricating oils is not a manufacturer or producer,2 3 7 but if he
employs a process of compounding or other manipulation involving substantially
more than the mere mixing of taxable oils, or if he mixes taxable oils with other
substances, he is classified as a manufacturer or producer.2 3 8 Similarly, a person who
produces reclaimed lubricating oils is a manufacturer or producer within the
statute.23 9 When a person produces lubricating oil in nonfluid form, he may treat
eight pounds of such product as the equivalent of one gallon for the purpose of
measuring his liability. 40 An oil having both lubricating and nonlubricating uses
may be sold tax free, if the manufacturer obtains an exemption certificate2 41 and if
the oil is put in a channel of consumption or distribution directed to such other
-23 INT. REv. CoDE §3412.235 rd. §3413•  23 6ibid.
237S. T. 548, M0-2 C. B. 450 (I93I). 238Ibid.
"IS. T. 853, 1937-I C. B. 323; S. T. 541 , XI-2 C. B. 449 (193).210 S. T. 712, MI1-2 C. B. 308 (1932).
2"U. S. Treas. Reg. 44 (1939) §314-43•
645'
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use.2 42 The types of oils which the Bureau regards as taxable under this tax are
indicated by the classification rulings listed in the margin.243
Questions have also arisen as to whether lubricating oil obtained by a vendee is
nontaxable because used as material in the manufacture of, or as a component part
of, an article subject to a manufacturers' excise tax.244 Lubricating oil mixed with
gasoline in the ratio of one part oil to ninety-nine parts gasoline is regarded as being
a component part of the gasoline and may therefore be purchased tax free for that
purpose.245 On the other hand, an automobile manufacturer may not purchase tax
free, oil for the crank cases of automobiles of his manufacture,240 nor may a manufac-
turer of a taxable product avoid tax on oil which will be consumed in the process
of manufacturing that product without becoming a component material of the
finished product. 247
Measurement of Price
The purpose of the general statutory provision2 48 with respect to the determina-
tion of price is to require the inclusion in the selling price of certain charges so closely
connected with the cost of manufacture or production as to constitute part of the
charge and to authorize the exclusion of other charges which, though they increase the
cost to the customer, form no integral part of the sale price. 49 The phrase "in con-
dition packed ready for shipment,"250 as used in the provision requiring the in-
clusion in the price basis of charges incident to placing the article in such condition,
has reference to an article packed ready for delivery to a customer upon a bona fide
sale.2 51 The charges which may be excluded from the price basis under this general
provision all relate to events occurring after the articles leave the point where delivery
commences-the factory or warehouse, as the case may be.252 Freight charges incurred
in moving articles from factory to warehouse before sale or from one warehouse to
another before sale are accordingly included in the price. 8 But freight charges
incurred after sale in shipping articles to customers may be excluded, and in such a
case it is immaterial whether the sale was f.o.b. factory, or the manufacturer prepaid
such charges, or the sale was made with "freight deductible" or "freight allowed."25 4
The expenses and commissions of a demonstrator selling articles subject to this
general provision are regarded as part of the selling price.255 If a manufacturer in-
cludes so-called "free" articles in a shipment billed at the regular price, the "free"
' S. T. 828, XV-I C. B. 380 (1935).
Taxable: S. T. 505, XI-2 . B. 448 (193x) (for cutting and machinery operations on metals).
Nontaxable: S. T. 9o5, 1940-2 C. B. 305 (agricultural spray oil, air conditioning oil, battery oil, paint oil,
putty oil, rust preventive oil, if sold by manufacturer direct to consumer); S. 'T'. 844, XV-2 C. B. 330
(1935) (highly refined special white oil); S. T. 839, XV-I C. B. 379 (1935) (crude neatsfoot oil and
transformer oil); S. T. 803, XIV-I C. B. 405 (i934) (petrolatum); S. T. 540, XI-2 C. B. 448 (1931)
(fatty oils of vegetable, animal, fish, or marine origin).
2
"INT. REv. CODE §3442(I). 2'rG. C. M. 15661, XIV-, C. B. 370 (I934),
246 S. T. 571, XI-z C. B. 451 (1931). 2I7 S. T. 460, XI-2 C. B. 514 (1931).
246 INT. REv. CODE §3441(a). ...G. C. M. 21114, 1939-i C. B. 351.
20. INr V REv. CODE §3441(a). "' G. C. M. 21114, supra note 249.
252 Ibid. 263 Ibid.
... S. T. 513, X-2 C. B. 511 (1931). Our S. T. 678, XII-I C. B. 415 (1932).
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articles are not regarded by the Bureau as a gift; they simply reduce the price of the
entire shipment.256 Cash discounts and trade discounts are subject to different rules.
In the case of a cash discount, the tax is computed upon the total price, but the
manufacturer may, in the month when the discount becomes effective, recompute
the tax on the net price and take credit for the difference on his return 257 Of course,
if the discount becomes effective in the month of sale, he may recompute his tax on
the net price and pay only the amount so computed 58 Where a trade discount is
granted unconditionally at the time of sale, such discount may be deducted from the
price and the tax computed on that basis 259
Exemption of Subsequent Sales
In conformity with a dictum in the Indian Motorcycle case260 to the effect that a
manufacturers' excise tax is laid only on the first or initial sale, the Bureau has
ruled261 that payment of the tax with respect to any particular article establishes
complete immunity from tax for subsequent resales or uses. Thus, if a manufacturer
reacquires a taxpaid article, as a trade-in or otherwise, a subsequent sale by him of
that article is not taxableY2 2 Questions have also arisen as to taxability of replace-
ments. If a defective article is replaced by the manufacture under a guaranty contract
and the manufacturer receives no consideration other than the defective article, the
transaction is not a sale and is consequently not taxable 26 3 But where an article is
sold under a warranty as to quality or service and the manufacturer is required to
replace it with a similar article for a payment less than the original price, the
transaction is a sale 6 4 In such a case, if the tax base is the price, the tax is computed
on the second payment; if the base is quantitative, the tax is computed upon that
proportion of the total weight of the second article which the reduced payment bears
to the regular sales pricey06
Credits and Refunds
No credit or refund of an overpayment of any manufacturers' excise tax may be
made unless the taxpayer establishes in accordance with regulations prescribed by
the Commissioner that either he has not included the tax in the price of the article
or has repaid the amount of the tax to the ultimate purchaser, or unless he files with
the Commissioner the consent of such purchaser to the allowance of credit or
refund.266 The validity of corresponding limitations in former revenue acts has
been upheld by the Supreme Court 267 The earlier limitations provided that the
exclusion of the tax from the price or the repayment thereof to the ultimate purchaser
should be established "to the satisfaction of the Commissioner." Such phrase, the
Court pointed out, did not give the Commissioner absolute authority as to credits
2
'aS. T. 484, XI-2 C. B. 508 (1931). 2 S. T. 616, XI-2 C. B. 512 (I931).
258 Ibid. 2r S. T. 628, XII-i C. B. 415 (1932).
"'Indian Motorcycle Co. v. U. S., supra note 162. 2"1 S. T. 867, 1937-2 C. B. 505.
202Ibid. ...S. T. 613, I-2 C. B. 454 (193i) •
2S. T. 644, XII-I C. B. 381 (i932). 285 ibid.
2. INT. PAv. CODE §3 4 4 3 (d).
'" U. S. v. Jefferson Electric Mfg. Co., 291 U. S. 386 (1934).
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and refunds; it was simply admonitive and meant proof which convinces in the
sense of inducing belief.20 8 Clearly, then, the present requirement that the facts
must be established in accordance with the Commissioner's regulations is valid. If,
in the case of any tax measured by price, the customer's bill does not indicate whether
the tax was included in the total price, it will be presumed that it was so included,
unless the presumption is overcome by evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner.,0 9
A person who purchases a taxpaid article for consumption or for use in the manufac-
ture of other articles and not for resale, is an ultimate purchaser within the statutory
provision under consideration 70
Sales for Use of the United States
The statutory provision 27' exempting sales of articles for the exclusive use of the
United States embraces sales to corporations wholly owned by the United States, 272
but not corporations which are only partly owned by the Governmentm 78 This
exemption also includes sales of articles for use on vessels owned by the United
States which are under the control of the Department of Commerce and operated
by the United States Shipping Board Merchant Fleet Corporation pursuant to a
managing agency agreement2 4 Exemption is also granted to sales of articles
for the exclusive use of any state or political subdivision thereof.275 Cooperative and
self-help associations organized for mutual aid and assistance and receiving federal
funds for the accomplishment of their purpose are simply organizations of individuals
rather than governmental bodies within this exemption.278  The meaning of the
terms used in such exemption are for determination by the Government and may not
be restricted by the views of a state.27 7 Thus, an irrigation district will be regarded
as a political subdivision within this exemption, despite a state court decision to the
contrary 278 Another exemption2 79 is granted to sales of articles for use on specified
classes of vessels. Included in this group are vessels of war of the United States,
although vessels of the Coast Guard may not, during peace time, be so classified.280
Articles for Export
The application to specific instances of the constitutional inhibition2 81 against
taxation of articles exported from any state has in the past occasioned some difficul-
ties, though these have been largely, if not entirely, cleared away by the Spalding
decision. 282 In that case, the articles were sold by the manufacturer to a commission
merchant for exportation to a foreign consignee, the sale being consummated by the
delivery of the articles, addressed to the consignee, to the exporting carrier. The
268 Ibid.
" S. T. 785, XHI-2 C. B. 413 (1933). 2.0 S. T. 690, XII-2 C. B. 341 (1932).
2 71 Nr. REv. CODE §3442(3). No such statutory exemption is provided for the analogous sugar tax,
and exemption is denied by Bureau ruling. P. T. 35, 1937-2 C. B. 530.
72S. T. 842, XV-2 C. B. 346 (1935). 2731bid.
174 S. T. 847, XV-2 C. B. 347 (1935). ... INT. REV. CODE §3442(3).
2""S. T. 796, XIV-i C. B. 411 (1934). 27738 O'. Ar'r'y GEN. (1937) 563.
Ibid. ... INT. REv. CODE §3451.
S. T. 724, X=I-r C. B. 390 (1933). ... U. S. CONSr. Art. x, §9, cl. 5.
28 2 Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U. S. 66 (1923).
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Court held that as the sale was a step in exportation it was not taxable; the possibility
that the commission merchant might have changed his mind and diverted the goods
into domestic channels was deemed to be immaterial. Thus, if the sale and delivery
by the manufacturer actually start the article to its foreign destination, either by the
immediate carrier or through connecting carriers, the sale is exempt.2 83 It is im-
material that further acts remain to be done before the goods are loaded on the
vessel, so long as such acts are only the regular steps to the contemplated result of
exportation.284 Nor is it necessary that the shipment be upon through bills of
lading. 28r
Intercompany Sales
Although manufacturers have gone to great lengths to avoid tax through the
medium of varying forms of intercompany sales, the Bureau and the courts have
made short shrift of most of these subterfuges. The transfer of large inventories by
the manufacturer to a sales subsidiary shortly before the adoption of these taxes did
not have the desired effect of insulating the manufacturer from taxation with respect
to sales made by the subsidiary after the effective date of the tax.2 8 6 The entire
scheme was a "colorable sham," an arrangement to avoid tax=  The sales subsidiary
was simply the instrumentality or agency of the manufacturer 288 Moreover, Con-
gress clearly foresaw that such stratagems might be resorted to after the enactment
of the law and guarded against them by including therein a provision that if an
article is sold (otherwise than through an arm's length transaction) at less than the
fair market price, the tax shall be computed on the price for which like articles are
sold, in the ordinary course of trade, by manufacturers or producers, as determined
by the Commissioner. 289 This provision hs been invoked in the case of sales between
(i) a manufacturing company and a sales subsidiary,290 (2) a manufacturing com-
pany and an affiliated sales company,291 and (3) a manufacturing plant and a sales
plant owned by the same company.292
COMMUNICATION FACILITIES
The taxes293 in respect of telephone conversations, telegraph, cable, and radio
messages, and leased wire or talking circuits, have apparently occasioned little diffi-
culty. In any instance the tax applies only to a service for which a charge, in money
or money's worth, is made294 and, in the case of telephone conversations, only if the
.. T. D. 3495, 11-2 C. B. 293 (1922).
284 Ibid. 285 Ibid.
... Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 113 F. (2d) 557 (C. C. A. ioth, 1940); E. Albrecht & Son v. Landy,
27 F. Supp. 65 (D. Minn. 1939); G. C. M. 14526, XIV-I C. B. 417 (x934).
287 G. C. M. 14526, supra note 286.
" E. Albrecht & Son v. Landy, G. C. M. 14526, both supra note 286.
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i2 F. Supp. 787 (V. D. N. Y. i935), aff'd, 85 F. (2d) 51o (C. C. A. 2d, 1936), cert. denied, 300 U. S.
682 (i937); S. T. 673, XII-I C. B. 400 (1933).
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LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
charge is above a stated minimum.295 It is paid to the service company by the person
using the communication facility, and by such company is paid over to the Govern-
ment. 2 96 Where a telegraph message is phoned over the facilities of a telephone
company, the latter acting as agent for the telegraph company, the responsibility for
collecting the tax rests with the principal. 29 7 Even though special statutory provision
is not made for the determination of the tax base in cases in which messages are
transmitted for the performance of services, as under a contract between a telegraph
company and a railroad company for the exchange of services, the Bureau's posi-
tion298 is that in such cases each message or conversation must be considered as a
separate transmission and the tax computed upon the basis of the regular established
charge for the transmission of single messages of the same character. This method
of tax determination under similar earlier laws was fully sustained by the courts.299
The tax base, in the case of telephone conversations, has been broadened 800 to
cover a charge not stricdy made for the use of the facilities, the charge exacted for
messenger-paging service provided by the company for the convenience of its patrons.
The tax301 relating to leased wires and talking circuits would seem to apply without
any limitations, other than the statutory exception as to such facilities when used by
specified companies in the conduct of their business as such. Nevertheless, if the
terminals of a leased wire service are all located within an area served by a local
exchange which does not charge tolls upon messages transmitted between points
within such area, it has been ruled30 2 that messages over the leased wire are not tax-
able. The exemption 0 3 as to facilities utilized in the collection of news for the public
press or in the dissemination of news through the public press does not extend to
messages by newspapers covering information or items for publication in periodicals
published for information on particular subjects or of interest only to particular
groups; such messages are not news within the meaning of the statute.1 4 Adminis-
trative messages of newspapers or press associations °30 are similarly not embraced by
the exemption 308
BrruMINous COAL
The statute307 imposes two taxes with respect to sales and other disposals of
bituminous coal by producers: (x) a tax308 of one cent per ton, which applies to all
producers; and (2) a tax309 in an amount equal to 19/2 per cent of the selling price
or fair-market value of the coal, applicable to nonmembers of the Bituminous
... INr. REv. CODE §3465(a)(I). 2 00 Id. §3467.
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FEDERAL EXPERIENCE WITH CONSUMPTION EXCISES
Coal Code. The tax provisions under consideration were originally enacted as part
of the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937,310 the objective of which was the stabilization
of the soft coal industry through price-fixing and the elimination of unfair competi-
tion.8 11 The tax applicable to nonmembers of the Code is clearly not designed
merely for revenue purposes. As a matter of fact, such tax, in purpose and effect,
is primarily a sanction to enforce the regulatory provisions of the act. Nevertheless,
it is constitutional.312 Congress may utilize the power of taxation as a sanction in aid
of the exercise of another power granted to it by the Constitution. The validity of
the tonnage tax has also been sustained3 3
CONCLUSIONS
The most outstanding characteristics of the federal consumption excises are their
great adaptability to revenue and nonrevenue purposes and the effectiveness with
which they may be used in both spheres. Of the taxes considered in this paper, three
groups,3 14 taken together, produced over $i,6oo,oooooo in 1940.315 On the other
hand, consumption excises have been utilized, often with drastic effectiveness, to
protect the public health or safety, to protect the public against fraudulent practices,
to protect certain businesses or industries against others, or to compel compliance
with Congressionally determined standards. Generally speaking, such nonrevenue
purposes are accomplished by one of three methods: (I) destructive taxation;
(2) regulatory provisions linked with tax-imposing provisions; or (3) utilization of
the taxing power as a sanction. The advantage of the first method is that it is
apparently subject to no special31 6 limitations. In any event, there is no case in which
an excise tax has been struck down solely because it was destructive. The disadvan-
tage arises from its very destructiveness. It can be used only to destroy. The second
and third methods, on the contrary, can be adjusted with utmost nicety to meet an
infinite variety of situations. In the case of the second method, the special limitation
would seem to be that the statute must be dressed in the language of a revenue meas-
ure and the regulatory provisions must bear some reasonable relation to the exercise of
the taxing power; that is, such provisions must show on their face that they tend to
protect the revenue or to facilitate its collectionP 7 The special limitation applicable
to the third method is the validity of the Congressionally determined standards. If
the latter represent the proper exercise of a Congressional power, the tax is valid as
an aid to the exercise of that other power8 s
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